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Labbe: Masi Management v. Town of Ogden

SUPREME COURT
MONROE COUNTY
1
Masi Management Inc. v. Town of Ogden
(decided February 25, 1999)

Plaintiff, Masi Management, Inc., claimed that the Town of
Ogden violated its property rights, under substantive due process,
as well as its equal protection rights, as is guaranteed by 42 U.S.C.
§19832, the United States3 and New York State Constitutions4 ,
when the Town approved a competing housing developer's
subdivision proposal over plaintiff's. The Supreme Court, Monroe
County, granted defendant, Town of Ogden's, motion to dismiss
under CPLR 321 l(a)7. 5 The court held that Masi Management's
substantive due process claim was not ripe for review and that the
suit was not cognizable under the state due process provision
because plaintiff did not prove that it had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the property rights asserted.6 Regarding the equal
protection claims, these were dismissed because the court found
the plaintiff not similarly situated with the competing developer.
1691 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1999).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in pertinent part:

2

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.

3 U.S. CONST.

amend XIV, sec. 1, which states in pertinent part: "[n]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. .... "
4 N.Y. CONST. art I., § 6, which states in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
' N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211 (McKinney 1999) states in pertinent part: "(a) Motion
to dismiss cause of action. A party may move for judgment dismissing one or
more causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: ...
pleading fails to state a cause of action. . . . " Id.
6
Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 714.
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Furthermore, no bad faith or malice was established as a result of
the competing developer being favored and represented by a town
council member's spouse.7
Masi Management is a housing developer in the Town of Ogden
who, in the Spring of 1997, submitted a proposal to the Town
Planning Board for a senior citizen housing development on
property that was zoned R-2 to permit duplex housing.' Plaintiff
asserts that, at the Town's urging, plaintiff discarded these plans,
and instead submitted a proposal in August 1997 for single-family
and free-standing patio homes; this second proposal did not
include any duplex housing.9 Later, competing developer Michael
LoPresti submitted a proposal for senior citizen housing; and upon
determining that the Town actually preferred this proposal, Masi
withdrew its August 1997 proposal and submitted one that did
contain a duplex subdivision, along with some minor sections that
called for uses not permitted by the zoning districts."0 The Town
rejected plaintiff's proposal, and plaintiff consequently brought
suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Town caused it
to expend effort and money in presenting its application, which
they never intended to approve from the outset."
The Supreme Court of Monroe County discussed the first and
third causes of action of the plaintiff together, because these dealt
with substantive due process under federal and state law,
respectively.' 2 The second and fourth causes of action were
likewise discussed together, since they dealt with equal protection
under federal and state law.1 3 The Monroe County Court dismissed
the plaintiffs substantive due process claim, 4 having focused its
analysis primarily on the federal constitutional claim because the
state due process jurisprudence does not cover the particular

7 Id. at
8

723.

Id. at 709.

9Id. at 709-10.
10 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 709-10.
" Id. at 709.
12 Id. at 710-11.
3
1 Id. at 718.
14 Id. at 716-17.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/22

2

Labbe: Masi Management v. Town of Ogden

534

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

circumstances of the case at bar. 5 Plaintiffs equal protection
6
claims were likewise dismissed.'
According to current jurisprudence that has interpreted the
Fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution, to bring forth a
substantive due process claim a plaintiff must assert a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a property interest. 7 Plaintiff advanced two
theories of entitlement, both of which the court rejected. Plaintiff's
first theory posited that plaintiff was entitled to positive
consideration of its large-lot single-family patio home project,
which the defendants had said they preferred.'" Instead, defendants
delayed their consideration until a competing developer submitted
his plans, which they accepted) 9
The court granted favorable assumptions to plaintiff- it assumed
that defendants were not allowed to delay consideration of
plaintiffs proposal and plaintiff was entitled to the zoning changes
that would have to result.20 Nevertheless, the court ruled that
plaintiff failed to make out a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim because the
plaintiff abandoned its proposal before an issuing agency had the
chance to render a final decision. Thus, the claim was not ripe for
2
review. 1
The court cited Covington Court, Ltd. v. Village of Oak Brook'Z
whose facts were very similar to this case. The Seventh Circuit in
Covington did not allow plaintiff to prevail on his federal due
process claims because he did not avail himself of all state court
remedies. 3 The court in Masi also relied on Orange Lake
Associates, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick24 which held that "a substantive due
process claim is not ripe for review absent the rendering of a final
decision by the governmental entity. '
"sMasi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 711.

Id. at 723.
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
'sMasi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 711.
91d.
I at 712.
20
1d. at 714.
21 Id. at 714-15.
2277 F.3d 177 (7th Cir. 1996).
16

17

23 d. at 179-80.
24

21 F.3d 1214 (2nd Cir. 1994).

2-

Id. at 1225.
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For similar reasons as above, the Supreme Court of Monroe
County also rejected plaintiff's second theory of entitlement in
advancing its federal due process claim. Under this theory,
'
plaintiff claimed "equitable estoppel."26
Specifically, plaintiff
contended that it was entitled to the existing R-2 zoning
classification that would accommodate its original proposal for
two-family duplexes but because the Town Board delayed
consideration of this proposal, the town prevented plaintiffs
property interest from vesting.27 Plaintiff claims the town delayed
consideration of its proposal long enough to enact amendments to
the zoning ordinance that enabled the competing proposal by
developer LoPresti to be accepted over plaintiffs'
The court
rejects this claim because, unlike the first theory, in this case
plaintiff never submitted a proposal for two-family duplexes.29
Since plaintiff did not follow the process through to its end, his
claim is yet again not ripe for review: "The court has found no case
which has sustained an inchoate substantive due process claim use
claim of this sort." °
However, the court again gives plaintiff the benefit of the doubt,
by supposing arguendothat plaintiff's proposal was submitted and
denied.31 Nevertheless, the court still rejected Plaintiffs second
theory because it is not certain that this interest in fact would have
vested.-32 Hence, a delay by the zoning board would not be a
26Masi,

691 N.Y.S.2d at 712. See also DLC Management Corp. v. Town of

Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 1998).

"In instances in which

construction has been improperly delayed by town officials in an attempt to
prevent vesting, the right to an existing zoning status may also vest by
equitable estoppel." Id. at 130-31.

27 Masi, 691

28 Id.

N.Y.S.2d at 712 (noting that
[D]efendants, by means of securing an agreement to delay
consideration of the project and setting plaintiff off on
another course, induced plaintiff to believe that the
alternative project for large-lot single-family and patio homes
would be approved under a change in the zoning law that, for
a long time, defendants wanted to enact anyway).

2 id.
30 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 712..
31
Id.
3Id. at 712-714.
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violation of plaintiffs substantive due process rights if vesting
could not have occurred despite the absence of the delay. The
court's reasoning is that under Town Law §§ 276 and 277, the
Planning Board has wide discretion to approve or deny a
subdivision plat.33 As a result, approval is not guaranteed, and this
will "preclude a claim of entitlement sufficient to create a property
interest cognizable under the substantive due process doctrine.' 3
According to the court, plaintiff is unsuccessful because it is
trying to put the cart before the horse. Masi Management is
asserting arbitrary conduct by the Town Planning Board without
having proven the threshold issue of whether it, plaintiff, has a
legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest. 3 For its
analysis, the court relies heavily on the Second Circuit federal case
of Zahra v. Town of Southold.3 6 This case advocated a "strict
entitlement" test37 and stands for the proposition that matters of
local concern, especially land-use disputes, should be handled by
3s
local government.
33

Id. at 714. See N.Y. TowN LAW §§ 276 and 277 (McKinney 1998).

'

Id. See also Honess 52 Corp. v. Town of Fishkill, I F. Supp.2d 294, 304

(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
35

Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
48 F.3d 674 (2nd Cir. 1995).
3 Id. at 680. The court noted that it
36

[u]ses a strict 'entitlement' test to determine whether a

party's interest in land-use regulation is protectible under the
Fourteenth Amendment (citations omitted). This inquiry
stems from the view that a property interest can sometimes
exist in what is sought - in addition to the property interest
that exists in what is owned - provided there is a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement' to the benefit in question (citations
omitted).

Id.
38 Id. Zahra states:
[D]ecisions on matters of local concern should ordinarily be
made by those whom local residents select to represent them
in municipal government - not by federal courts ....

The

Due Process Clause does not function as a general overseer
of arbitrariness in state and local land-use decisions; in our
federal system, that is the province of state courts.
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Plaintiff, on its behalf, put forth decisions from the Third Circuit
where the strict entitlement test was not applied." This was an
attempt by plaintiff to show that the Second Circuit also need not
apply a strict entitlement test. The court however summarily
rejected this, ° and cited the dissenting opinion in another Third
Circuit case that disagreed with the above philosophy.4 ' In any
event, the court relied on and felt bound by the prevailing view in
the state, which is to follow the legitimate claim of entitlement
test.42 Consequently, a showing that defendants may have acted
improperly will not be sufficient, on its own, to make out a
substantive due process claim if the entitlement aspect has not been
proven 43
With regard to plaintiff's substantive due process claim under
the New York State Constitution, the court ruled that plaintiff's
claim would receive no broader consideration under state law.
This is because the New York Court of Appeals has not provided a
clear, unambiguous rule on the issue. In two cases, namely
Sharrockv. Dell Buick-Cadillac" and Cooper v. Morin,' the Court
of Appeals interpreted the state due process guarantee as broader
" See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment for Tp. of West Amwell, 53
F.3d 592, 600-01 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding that ownership alone establishes a
cognizable property interest and plaintiff would simply have to show that
Board acted arbitrarily or irrationally). "We are less certain that the
'legitimate claim of entitlement' approach is mandated by Supreme Court
jurisprudence." Id., fa. 9 at 601.
40 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
41 Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Judge Alito,
in dissent, argued that Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (1988 ) and its progeny
(which includes DeBlasio) were wrongly decided and "based on a misreading
of Supreme Court precedent." (Alito, J. dissenting in part). Id. at 184.
42 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717. For § 1983 decisions that followed this
formulation, see, e.g., Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41, 52-3,
665 N.E.2d 1061, 1067-8, 643 N.Y.S.2d 21, 27-28 (1996); see also Matter of
Twin Town Little League, Inc. v. Town of Poestenkill, 249 A.D.2d 811, 812,
671 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (1998); and Reed's of Armonk Bldg. Supply, Inc. v.
Curry, 246 A.D.2d 587, 667 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1998).
' See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
"MMasi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
4545 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978).
4649 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979).
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than that of the federal. 7 In Sharrock,the court rejected the notion
that state action was required in the context of a procedural due
process claim. 4 In Cooper, the court held that a pretrial detainee
was entitled to contact visitation as a matter of State, but not
Federal, constitutional law.49 In other cases, the court refused to
extend the reach of the state due process clause."0 As a result, the
Masi court was hesitant to announce a new constitutional rule."1
Additionally, since a state administrative remedy was available
(Article 78-mandamus), which plaintiff did not utilize before
bringing its state constitutional claim, the claim would probably
not have been ripe.
The second and fourth causes of action advanced by plaintiff
involved equal protection under Federal 2 and State law. 3 The
court evaluated the two claims together because it determined the
analysis of an equal protection claim under federal and state law to
be identical.'
Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717. See also People v. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d 156,
556 N.E.2d 423, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1990), where the Court of Appeals found
that the state due process provision conferred a more protective benefit than its
federal counterpart with respect to enhanced sentencing following a successful
appeal, retrial, and reconviction. Id. at 162, 556 N.E.2d at 426, 556
N.Y.S.2d at 987.
4s Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 159-60, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173-4, 408 N.Y.S.2d
39, 44. "On innumerable occasions this court has given our State Constitution
an independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the citizens of
this State even more protection than may be secured under the United States
Constitution." Id. at 159.
49 Cooper, 49 N.Y.2d at 73, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 1190, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168, 17071. Cooper, however, has been used as support in numerous dissenting
opinions rather than majority ones.
10 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717. See, e.g., People v. Alvarez, 70 N.Y.2d 375,
379-80, 515 N.E.2d 898, 900, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 214 (1987), and People v.
Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191, 197, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 48
(1988).
51 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1, which states in pertinent part: " [Nor] shall
any state.. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
53 N.Y. CONST.art I, § 11 This section provides in pertinent part: "No person
47

shall be denied equal protection under the laws of this state .

. ." Id.

5 See supra note 13 and accompanying text..
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The essence of an equal protection analysis is that those
individuals who are similarly situated should be treated similarly."5
The prevailing case law regarding making a claim for violation of
equal protection based on illegal discrimination comes from
Washington v. Davis, 56 even though it has been cited in many
dissenting and concurring opinions. There, the United States
Supreme Court held that where a law is not discriminatory on its
face, plaintiffs have to show purposeful discrimination by
defendants in order to demonstrate an equal protection violation.'
Since the zoning codes in this case were not facially
discriminatory, plaintiff had to show that the codes were
selectively enforced in violation of federal and state law. 8
The elements of a violation of equal protection by selective
enforcement are: 1) the person compared with others similarly
situated, was selectively treated; and 2) that such selective
treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race,
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional
rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. 9 The
court found that the zoning codes were not selectively enforced
because plaintiff was, in fact, not similarly situated with the
competing developer.'
Because plaintiff withdrew its original
plans for large-lot, single-family, patio homes, plaintiff was no
longer similarly situated with LoPresti, especially once plaintiff

I See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).
:1

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

Id. at 239. See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1(1944) stating:
The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those
who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
Id.
at
8.
5
1Masi,

691 N.Y.S.2d at 718.

" LaTrieste Restaurant and Cabaret Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d
587, 590 (2nd Cir. 1994).
60 Masi, 691 N.Y.S. at 718-19.
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submitted its revised proposal for two-family duplexes. 6 ' Hence,
the two developers do not even share commonalities, which is a
lower threshold than having to be identical.62 Furthermore,
plaintiffs allegations in its complaint makes an effort to point out
63
the differences in the two developer's proposals.
Additionally, assuming that plaintiff and LoPresti were similarly
situated, the court found that plaintiff did not prove the element
that the defendants treated plaintiff differently based on
impermissible classifications or maliciously or in bad faith.'
There is a split in the circuits as to whether a showing of just
malicious or bad faith intent to injure is enough to support an equal
protection claim or whether it also must be shown that this
malicious action was to punish an exercise of constitutional
rights. 65
The Second Circuit courts support the former
postulation,' whereas the Sixth and Seventh Circuits subscribe to
the latter view.67 The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly recognize
the former postulation.
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals has not yet settled the
question. 61 The Court of Appeals has adopted the following
formulation regarding selective enforcement within equal
protection analysis: "there must be not only a showing that the law
was not applied to others similarly situated but also that the
selective application of the law was deliberately based upon an
impermissible standard such as race, religion or some other

61

id.

See Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F.Supp. 1400, 1405 (W.D.Wis 1993)
(holding that those similarly situated need not be identical in makeup - sharing
commonalities can merit similar treatment).
6 Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
6 Id. at 720.
6 Id.
' See FSK Drug Corp. v. Perales, 960 F.2d 6, 10 (2nd Cir. 1992); Zahra v.
Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683-4 (2nd Cir. 1995); and Snowden v.
62

Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (2nd Cir. 1944).

See, e.g., Futernick v. Sumpter Tp., 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir. 1996);
see also Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1998);
see also Esmail v. Macrane, 53 F.3d 176, 178 (7th Cir 1995).
6Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
67
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arbitrary classifications."'6 9 The court in Masi reasoned that the fact
the Court of Appeals made reference to "classification" in its
formulation indicates that it "has yet to consider whether nonclass-based individual discrimination is sufficient to state a
selective enforcement claim under Supreme Court precedents."7
As a result, the Masi court refused to overstep its bounds yet again
and held that allegations of different treatment alone will not be
enough to allege malice or bad faith intent to injure.71
Consequently, the court found that plaintiff did not show that it
was maliciously singled out,72 because even political motivation of
the kind involved in this case will not be considered malice within
the meaning of the selective enforcement rule.' The court cited
Cordeco Development Corp. v Santiago Vasquez, 74 to support its
reasoning; but it is navigating a slippery slope, since in Cordeco
political motivation to favor another developer was held to be
enough to support an equal protection claim.75 However, the court
relied on the fact that this issue was not challenged below76 and
thus, the "federal basis for liability was never expressly litigated." 7
It appears then that under Masi Management v. Town of Ogden
and prior case law, a substantive due process claim under federal
and state law more often than not will be analyzed similarly, since
an analysis under the state constitution has yet to unambiguously
call for a different standard or interpretation. The New York Court
People v Blount, 90 N.Y.2d 998, 999, 688 N.E.2d 500, 665 N.Y.S.2d 626
(1997).
69

70

Masi, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 721 n. 3.
Id. at 721. See also Indiana State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of School
Com'rs of the City of Indianapolis, 101 F.3d 1179, where the Court states that
allowing a loser in a contest to appeal on grounds that the decision was
arbitrary, treating likes as unlike and resulting in an equal protection violation
"would constitutionalize the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 1181,

7'

72 See supra note 7.
73Id. at 722.
74 539 F.2d 256 (1st

75 Id. at
76

Cir. 1976).

260.

1d., fn. 5.

1 Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir.
1982).
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of Appeals still has not rendered a decision on whether the State's
interpretation of its due process clause in relation to the federal
interpretation will, in general, be broader, narrower, or the same.
However, there is currently no danger that there will be a
divergence in the way equal protection claims will be analyzed
under Federal and State law: they are similarly situated - even to
the extent that both are not settled as to how to treat non-classbased discrimination.
Magdale L. Labbe
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